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Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing for Multiple Numerical
Sensitive Attributes
Qinghai Liu, Hong Shen , and Yingpeng Sang
Abstract: Anonymized data publication has received considerable attention from the research community in recent
years. For numerical sensitive attributes, most of the existing privacy-preserving data publishing techniques
concentrate on microdata with multiple categorical sensitive attributes or only one numerical sensitive attribute.
However, many real-world applications can contain multiple numerical sensitive attributes. Directly applying the
existing privacy-preserving techniques for single-numerical-sensitive-attribute and multiple-categorical-sensitiveattributes often causes unexpected disclosure of private information. These techniques are particularly prone to
the proximity breach, which is a privacy threat specific to numerical sensitive attributes in data publication. In
this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving data publishing method, namely MNSACM, which uses the ideas of
clustering and Multi-Sensitive Bucketization (MSB) to publish microdata with multiple numerical sensitive attributes.
We use an example to show the effectiveness of this method in privacy protection when using multiple numerical
sensitive attributes.
Key words: privacy-preserving; k -anonymity; numerical sensitive attribute; clustering; Multi-Sensitive Bucketization
(MSB)
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Introduction

The collection of digital information by governments,
corporations, and individuals has enabled knowledge
discovery and information-based decision making.
Publishing data for analysis from a table containing
personal records, while maintaining individual privacy,
is becoming a problem of increasing importance
today. The objective is to limit the privacy disclosure
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risk to an acceptable level while maximizing the
benefit due to publication of the data. The traditional
approach of anonymization is to remove identification
fields such as social security number and name. A
common anonymization approach is generalization,
which replaces quasi-identifier values with values
that are less-specific but semantically consistent. As
a result, more records will have the same set of
quasi-identifier values. In 2002, Sweeney[1] proposed
the k-anonymity model for privacy protection where
the corresponding attributes that leak information are
suppressed or generalized so that, for every record
in the modified table, there are at least k
1 other
records that have exactly the same values for the quasiidentifiers. There are many successful applications[2–6]
based on k-anonymity. However, while k-anonymity
protects data against identity disclosure, it is insufficient
to prevent attribute disclosure.
To address this limitation of k-anonymity,
Machanavajjhala et al.[7] introduced a new notion
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of privacy, called l-diversity, which requires that the
distribution of a sensitive attribute in each equivalence
class has at least l “well represented” values. Li et al.[8]
proposed a novel privacy notion called t-closeness,
which requires that the distribution of a sensitive
attribute in any equivalence class is close to the
distribution of the attribute in the overall table (i.e.,
the distance between the two distributions is no more
than a threshold t). This effectively limits the amount
of individual specific information an observer can
learn. In addition, several principles were introduced,
such as .c; k/-safety[9] and ı-presence[10] . In 2006,
Xiao and Tao[11] proposed Anatomy, which is a data
anonymization approach that divides one table into
two for release. One table includes the original quasiidentifier and a group id, and the other includes the
association between the group id and the sensitive
attribute values.
In this paper, we study privacy protection on
numerical sensitive attributes, such as salary and bonus.
We introduce a privacy-preserving data publishing
method for multiple numerical sensitive attributes—
MNSACM. This anonymization principle uses the
ideas of clustering and Multi-Sensitive Bucketization
(MSB). We use an example to show that this method can
provide effective protection with multiple numerical
sensitive attributes.

can be 985, 1030, 1015, or 40 000. However, if an
adversary possesses the QI-values of Andy, he is able
to determine that Andy’s record is definitively in the
first QI-group of Table 2. Without further information,
he assumes that each tuple in the group has an equal
chance of belonging to Andy. Thus, he can confirm
that Andy’s salary is in the interval [985,1030] with a
75% probability. Consequently, the adversary arrives at
a privacy-intruding claim “Andy’s salary is very likely
around 1000.”

2

2.2

2.1

Preliminaries
Proximity breach

The motivation of this work is that, prior anonymization
principles are not effective at preventing the “proximity
breach”, which is a privacy threat specific to numerical
sensitive attributes (such as salary). Intuitively, a
proximity breach occurs when an adversary concludes,
with high confidence, that the sensitive value of a victim
individual must fall in a short interval, even though the
adversary has low confidence about the victim’s actual
value.
Consider an example, as shown in Table 1, where
a company intends to publish its payment records.
The publication must ensure that no adversary can
accurately infer the salary of any employee. Age and
Zipcode are Quasi-Identifier (QI) attributes and Table
2 demonstrates a generalized version of Table 1. As
seen from Table 2, an adversary can no longer uniquely
determine Andy’s salary because any tuple of the
first QI-group can belong to Andy. Hence, his salary

Table 1
Name
Andy
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5

Age
16
18
19
23
30
35
Table 2

Group ID
1
1
1
1
2
2

The microdata 1.
ZIP.
12000
12000
14000
15000
21000
24000

Salary
985
1030
1015
40 000
16 000
23 000

Generalization data.

Age
[16, 23]
[16, 23]
[16, 23]
[16, 23]
[30, 35]
[30, 35]

ZIP.
[12000, 15000]
[12000, 15000]
[12000, 15000]
[12000, 15000]
[21000, 24000]
[21000, 24000]

Salary
985
1030
1015
40 000
16 000
23 000

The ("", m)-anonymity principle

For numerical sensitive attributes, Zhang et al.[12]
proposed the notion of .k; e/-anonymity in 2007. The
general idea is to partition the records into groups,
such that each group contains at least k different
sensitive values with a range of at least e. However,
.k; e/-anonymity ignores the distribution of sensitive
values within the range. If some sensitive values occur
frequently within a given subrange, the attacker can
still confidently infer the subrange in a group. In 2008,
Li et al.[13] introduced a new anonymization principle,
(", m)-anonymity, which eliminates the proximity
breach in publishing numeric sensitive attributes. This
principle is based on a natural rationale given a QIgroup G, for every sensitive value x in G, at most 1=m
of the tuples in G can have sensitive values “similar”
to x. However, this paper concentrates on microdata
that contains only a single sensitive attribute. Directly
applying the (", m)-anonymity principle to microdata
with multiple numerical sensitive attributes often causes
unexpected private disclosure of information.
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Table 3 shows the microdata and Table 4 has the
posted results after salary is handled by (1000, 3)anonymity. It cannot result in loss of privacy for salary,
but for the related bonus. For example, if Bob in the first
QI-group, any tuple in the first QI-group can belong to
Bob. Hence, without further information, an adversary
assumes that each tuple in the group has an equal chance
of being owned by Bob. Thus, an adversary concludes
that Bob’s bonus may be 1000, 1010, or 5000. Bob’s
salary is likely around 1000 with a 67% probability.

3

Model and Method

3.1

3.1.2

Related works

3.1.1

Approaches of multi-sensitive MSB

In 2008, Yang et al.[14] discussed the problem of secure
publishing of sensitive data, which contains multiple
attributes. They proposed a multi-dimensional bucket
grouping approach based on the idea of lossy join,
called MSB. In addition, they used suppression ratio
to measure information loss, which is the proportion of
suppression records in the total records. The calculation
method is as follows:
ns
supRatio D
;
kT k
where ns is the number of suppression records kT k
is the number of total records. Clearly, a smaller
suppression ratio implies a fewer the number of
suppression records, thereby, resulting in smaller
information loss. Ideally, the suppression ratio is 0. In
this paper, we also use suppression ratio to analyze
efficiency of the MNSACM algorithm.
Table 3
ID
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6

Age
25
26
38
32
29
37
Table 4

ID
1
1
1
2
2
2

Age
[25, 29]
[25, 29]
[25, 29]
[32, 38]
[32, 38]
[32, 38]

The microdata 2.
ZIP.
13000
16000
27000
21000
18000
23000

Salary
1000
4200
4100
5200
3020
3100

Bonus
1010
5000
6000
2100
1000
4000

(1000,3)-anonymity.

ZIP.
[13000, 18000]
[13000, 18000]
[13000, 18000]
[21000, 27000]
[21000, 27000]
[21000, 27000]

In 2010, Liu et al.[15] proposed two data
publishing algorithms — l-SNSA (only one numerical
sensitive attribute) and l-MNSA (multi numerical
attributes). Given deficiencies in MSB and the
different requirements of privacy-preserving and data
availability in different application scenes, Liu et al.[16]
proposed a (g, l)-group anonymous model that gives
full consideration to the sensitivity attributes based
on MSB, and also present an l-coverage clustering
grouping anonymous model based on the same sensitive
attribute set.

Salary
1000
4200
3020
4100
5200
3100

Bonus
1010
5000
1000
6000
2100
4000

Clustering-based approaches

In the context of data mining, clustering is a useful
technique that partitions records into clusters such that
records within a cluster are similar to each other, while
records in different clusters are distinct from one to
another. There are a few papers[17–21] that have used
this technology to accomplish k-anonymization. During
the last few decades, considerable effort has been
devoted to the study of the k-anonymity model. Many
approaches have been proposed for k-anonymization
and its variations. Please refer to Ciriani et al.[22] for a
survey of various k-anonymization approaches. In this
paper, we use the ideas of clustering which cluster the
values of sensitive attributes into multiple approximate
groups based on the approximate degree.
3.2

The method

In this section we will describe the implementation
process of the method. We assume that the original
data D has n records and every record has m
numerical sensitive attributes. For simplicity, we omit
the identifier and quasi-identifier and assume that
m is a positive integer. We mark the numerical
sensitive attributes as S1 ; S2 ;    ; Sm . For each Si ; 1 6
i 6 m, we put its values into multiple groups based
on
˚ the approximate degree, which are marked as
Si1 ; Si 2 ;    ; Sij , and the union of the groups can
cover all the values of Si ; 1 6 i 6 m. The intersection
of any two groups is the empty set simultaneously. For
example, assume S1 is salary. This implies that there
are n numerical values in S1 , on which we can use the
numerical cluster method to put the n numerical values
into multiple groups, where the size of each group can
be different. Assume n D 20, and we can cluster them
into 5 groups, i.e., fS11 ; S12 ; S13 ; S14 ; S15 g. Figure 1
shows the process of clustering.
Subsequently, we structure the multi-dimensional
bucket. Every sensitive attribute corresponds to
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The process of clustering.

a single-dimension of the multi-dimensional
bucket. Consequently, if D has m numerical
sensitive attributes, we structure an multi-dimensional
bucket. The n records of D are mapped into the
corresponding bucket according to their own
sensitive attributes. For example, if we assume
D has nine records ft1 ; t2 ;    ; t9 g, two sensitive
attributes S1 and S2 , and each sensitive attribute is
clustered into four groups, S1 D fS11 ; S12 ; S13 ; S14 g;
S2 D fS21 ; S22 ; S23 ; S24 g, then we can structure the
bucket as Table 5.
Once the multi-dimensional bucket is structured, we
can select different records to form the corresponding
QI-group. In Ref. [14], three specific line-time greed
based MSB algorithms are proposed, MBF, MSDCF,
and MMDCF. We compute the suppression ratio and
additional information loss respectively and select the
optimal one amongst them. Subsequently, we get a
number of different records to form the corresponding
QI-group. Since the records in each QI-group are
selected from different rows and different columns of
the multi-dimensional bucket, their sensitive attributes
are taken from different Sij . Therefore, there is no
proximity breach. Next, we propose an algorithm
(Algorithm 1) for the MNSACM method.
We can summarize the implementation of MNSACM
as follows:
(1) For numerical sensitive attributes of the
microdata, we use cluster technology to put them
into multiple groups.
(2) Structure the multi-dimensional bucket, such
that every sensitive attribute corresponds to a singleTable 5
S21
S22
S23
S24

S11
ft1 ; t4 g
t5

S12

S13

S14
t3

ft6 ; t7 g
t8
t9

Algorithm 1
MNSACM.
Input: DataSet T , parameter l
Output: Anonymous table T 0
1: get numerical sensitive attributes S1 ; S2 ;    ; Sm and all
values;
2: for each Si .1 6 i 6 m/;
3: cluster values into approximate groups, i.e. Sij ; .1 6 i 6
m; 1 6 j 6 n/;
4: end for;
5: each Si .1 6 i 6 m/ correspond to one dimension into
a bucket, establish m dimension bucket Bucket .S1 ;
S2 ;    ; Sm );
6: calculate the capacity of approximate groups for each Si .1 6
i 6 m/;
7: while(can extract records constitute a group)
8: set unshielded marker for all buckets, Grouping Gi D ,
i
1;
9: Calculation selection of non empty bucket;
10: for .j D 1I j 6 lI j C C/
11: if(there is non empty and unshielded bucket)
12: select a record t from the maximum selection bucket buk and
add it into group Gi ;
13: delete t from buk, and size(buk)=size(buk) 1;
14: recalculate the capacity of buk for each dimension;
15: Shielding the bucket which has the same approximate group
with t ;
16: g
17: else
18: if(there is no record can choose)
19: the end of the group process;
20: g
21: end for;
22: i C CI
23: end while
24: if(Bucket(S1 ; S2 ;    ; Sm / ¤ ∅)
25: suppress all the remaining records in multi-dimensional
bucket;
26: generalize quasi identifier in each Gi ;
0
27: return an anonymity table T

dimension of the multi-dimensional bucket.
(3) According to the three methods, MBF, MSDCF,
and MMDCF[14] , we can choose different records to
make up the matching QI-group.
(4) Structure the anonymous table.
We can use Fig. 2 to show the process of MNSACM.
3.3

Example two-dimensional bucket.

t2
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Example

In this section we propose our model and methods
via the following real situation, as shown in Table
6. There are two numerical sensitive attributes in
Table 6, which are salary and bonus (ID is an explicit
identifier, and Age and ZIP. are quasi-identifiers). We
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Table 7
S21
S22
S23
S24
S25

Fig. 2

Process demonstration of MNSACM.
Table 6

ID
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
t8
t9

Age
27
22
34
26
30
32
22
37
39

The microdata 3.
ZIP.
12000
22000
24000
17000
16000
14000
19000
26000
27000

Salary
1000
2975
10 100
1040
3050
5000
5120
7950
1050

Bonus
1010
1010
950
2000
2020
3035
2950
4100
6000

put the salary cluster into five groups: S11 D f1000;
1040; 1050g, S12 D f2975; 3050g, S13 D f5000;
5120g, S14 D f7950g, S15 D f10 100g. Analogously,
we also put the bonus cluster into five groups: S21 D
f1010; 1010; 950g, S22 D f2020; 2000g; S23 D f3035;
2950g; S24 D f4100g; S25 D f6000g.
We make salary and bonus to be the first dimension
and the second dimension, respectively. Five cluster
groups of salary correspond to the five columns and
the five cluster groups of bonus correspond to the
five rows. We can use a table to show it. Every
cell in the table represents a bucket, then all the
records can be mapped into the corresponding bucket
according to their own sensitive attributes. For example,
with t1 , its salary belongs to S11 and its bonus
belongs to S21 . Therefore, we put t1 in the upper
left bucket. Similarly, we place all the other records
as well. Subsequently, we structure a two-dimensional
bucket, as shown in Table 7.
According to the three methods, MBF, MSDCF,
and MMDCF[14] , we can choose different records to
make up the matching QI-group. We get ft1 ; t5 ; t6 ; t8 g
when we use MBF. We need to suppress the record
ft2 ; t3 ; t4 ; t7 ; t9 g, and compute the suppression ratio and

The two-dimensional bucket.

S11
t1
t4

S12
t2
t5

S13

S14

S15
t3

ft6 , t7 g
t8
t9

the additional information loss, which are 0.56 and
0.3, respectively. We can see that the implementation
process of MBF is easy, however, the suppression ratio
and additional information loss are too large; as a
result, the effect of grouping is not satisfactory. We
get the result ft3 ; t4 ; t6 g and ft5 ; t7 ; t8 ; t9 g if we use
MSDCF. We need to suppress the record ft1 ; t2 g and the
suppression ratio is 0.22, and the additional information
loss is 0.17, which shows that the effect of grouping
is better than with MBF. With MMDCF, the result
is ft1 ; t5 ; t6 g; ft2 ; t4 ; t7 g, and ft3 ; t8 ; t9 g, and we need
not suppress any records. Both the suppression ratio
and the additional information loss are zero in this
case. As seen, the effect of grouping with MMDCF is
the best. However, its process is the most complex.
By comparing the three methods, we find that
MMDCF is the best in that it can form three
groups, which are ft1 ; t5 ; t6 g; ft2 ; t4 ; t7 g, and ft3 ; t8 ; t9 g
respectively. Through the generalization of the quasiidentifier in each group, we publish the anonymity table,
Table 8.
We find that there are three QI-groups in the table
and that the sensitive attributes of each QI-group are
selected from different clustering groups. We prevent
the proximity breach successfully.

4

Experiment

We implemented the algorithm proposed in this
paper, and conducted a series of experiments to
Table 8
Group ID
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3

Age
[27, 32]
[27, 32]
[27, 32]
[22, 26]
[22, 26]
[22, 26]
[34, 39]
[34, 39]
[34, 39]

The anonymity table.
ZIP.
[12000, 16000]
[12000, 16000]
[12000, 16000]
[17000, 22000]
[17000, 22000]
[17000, 22000]
[24000, 27000]
[24000, 27000]
[24000, 27000]

Salary
1000
3050
5000
2975
1040
5120
10 100
7950
1050

Bonus
1010
2020
3035
1010
2000
2950
950
4100
6000
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verify the efficiency of our algorithm. All the
experiments are conducted on a computer with an
Intel Core i5-2450M CPU and 4 GB memory running
the Microsoft Windows 7 operating system. The
algorithm is implemented in Java. Our experiment
deploys a real database SAL commonly used in
literature (Downloadable at http://ipums.org.). It
contains 5  105 tuples, each of which describes
the personal information of an American. We select
three integer attributes to be sensitive attributes, i.e.,
birthplace, occupation, and income, and corresponding
domains are [1,710], [1,983], and Œ1  103 , 1  105 ,
respectively. The experiment first filters incomplete
records of the primary SAL data set, and then extracts
2:5  105 records randomly.
Figure 3 is a histogram that shows how the
suppression ratio changes with data size while l D 4.
The red podetium show the suppression ratio when the
data has three numerical sensitive attributes. The blue
podetium show the suppression ratio when the data
has two numerical sensitive attributes (occupation and
income). In Fig. 3, when the data size and l are same,
the red podetium is higher than the blue podetium. This
shows that the suppression ratio of data is higher
when the sensitive attribute dimension is larger. This
is because there is a greater restriction in selecting
records, when the sensitive attribute dimension is
larger. Finally, the remaining records increase leading
to an increase in the suppression ratio. From a global
perspective, with the increase in data size, the height
of podetium gradually reduces, in other words, the
suppression ratio has a decreasing trend. This is because
as the data size increases, we need to build more
record groups and there are more records that can be
selected. Consequently, once the original remaining
records are added to some record groups, the proportion

Fig. 3

Suppression ratio changes with data size.
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of remaining records is reduced and the suppression
ratio decreases.
Figure 4 shows the suppression ratio changes
histogram with l, where the data size is 2  105 . In
order to have a comparison, we set l to be 3, 5, 7, and 9,
respectively. From Fig. 4, we can also see that when the
data size and l are same, the red podetium is higher than
the blue podetium. In other words, the suppression ratio
of data is higher when the sensitive attribute dimension
is larger. From a global perspective, with an increase
in l, the height of the podetium increases gradually,
showing that the suppression ratio has an increasing
trend. This is because the larger the l, the higher the
privacy requirements; as a result, ensuring the group ldiversity in each dimension is more difficult. Thus the
overall effect of variation grouping becomes worse (the
suppression ratio of data increases).
Figure 5 shows the CPU runtime changes line chart
with data size. Similar to Fig. 3, in order to have a
comparison, we set the data size to be 5  104 , 10  104 ,
15  104 , 20  104 , and 25  104 , respectively, where
l D 4. The red line shows the CPU runtime for when the
data has three sensitive attributes. The blue line shows
the CPU runtime for when the data has two sensitive
attributes (occupation and income). From Fig. 5, we see
that when the data size and l are both the same, the
red line is higher than the blue line. This implies that
the CPU runtime is longer when the sensitive attribute
dimension is larger; in other words, the CPU runtime
is proportional to the sensitive attribute dimension. This
is because the higher the sensitive attribute dimension,
the larger the computational clustering and record
extraction step. As a result, the CPU runtime increases.
Figure 6 shows the CPU runtime changes histogram
with l, where the data size is 2  105 . In order to
have a comparison, we also set l to be 3, 5, 7, and 9,

Fig. 4

Suppression ratio changes histogram with l.
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Fig. 5

CPU runtime changes with data size.

Fig. 7 Suppression ratio of MNSACM and l-MNSA with
different data sizes.

the suppression ratio of MNSACM is smaller than lMNSA. Therefore, MNSACM is better than l-MNSA
in suppression ratio. From a global perspective, we can
also see that the suppression ratio has a decreasing
trend.

5

Fig. 6

CPU runtime changes with l.

respectively. The red podetiums show the CPU runtime
when the data has three sensitive attributes. The blue
podetiums show the CPU runtime when the data has
two sensitive attributes (occupation and income). From
Fig. 6, we see that the data size and l are both
the same, the red podetium is higher than the blue
podetium. This re-iterates that the CPU runtime is
proportional to the sensitive attribute dimension. From a
global perspective, although the CPU running time with
l shows some changes, the influence is minor. This is
because the value of l does not influence the structure
of the multi-dimensional bucket.
In Fig. 7, we compare the suppression ratio
of MNSACM with the suppression ratio of lMNSA. Directly, we set the data size to be 5  104 ,
10  104 , 15  104 , 20  104 , and 25  104 , respectively,
where l D 4 and d D 3. The red podetium show the
suppression ratio of l-MNSA with five different data
sizes. The blue podetium show the suppression ratio
of MNSACM with five different data sizes. In Fig. 7,
when the data size is the same, the red podetium
is higher than the blue podetium. This implies that

Conclusions

Proximity breach is a natural privacy threat to numerical
sensitive data, especially for data with multiple
numerical sensitive attributes. In this paper, we propose
a new method called MNSACM, which eliminates this
threat. This method uses the ideas of clustering and
MSB. We use an example to show that this method can
provide protection with multiple numerical sensitive
attributes satisfactorily. We propose an algorithm to
realize the MNSACM method and conduct a series of
experiments to evaluate our algorithm. However, our
discussion assumes one-time publication of a static
data set, whereas it remains open how to ensure
MNSACM in multiple re-publications of a dynamic
data set. This is a challenging problem because an
adversary may utilize the intricate correlations among
various published versions to increase his chance of
breaching the privacy of an individual.
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